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 OPINION 
                      
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
  
 In this action for contribution under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601, et seq., ("CERCLA"), Witco Corporation ("Witco") asserts 
its claim against: Jeanne V. Beekhuis (daughter of Dr. H. Albert 
Beekhuis and executrix for his estate); Wilmington Trust Company 
("WTC") (trustee of two trusts created by Dr. Beekhuis); and 
Brandywine Chemical Company ("Brandywine Chemical") 
(collectively, "the defendants"). 
 
 
 Witco's claim relates to a parcel of land ("the site") 
previously owned by Halby Products and Halby Chemical Company 
(collectively, "Halby").  Dr. Beekhuis was an officer, director 
and majority stockholder of Halby.  The site became Witco's 
property in 1972 when Halby merged into Witco's subsidiary.  In 
1977, the site was sold to Brandywine Chemical.  Thereafter, 
because the site was contaminated with various chemicals, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") placed the site on 
the CERCLA National Priorities List.   
 In 1992, Witco entered into a Consent Decree with the 
EPA to provide for the cleanup of the site.  Witco now seeks 
contribution from the defendants for the costs associated with 
cleaning the site.  Witco's claim against Jeanne Beekhuis is in 
her representative capacity as executrix of the estate of Dr. 
Beekhuis, and its claim against WTC is in its capacity of 
trustee, charged with the responsibility of paying the debts of 
the estate of Dr. Beekhuis. 
 The district court entered two orders which are at 
issue in this appeal.  In the first order dated May 20, 1993, the 
court held that the CERCLA statute of limitations for 
contribution did not preempt Delaware probate law.  In a second 
order dated November 24, 1993, the district court held that the 
Estate was entitled to statutory indemnification from Witco.  
Although these two orders did not terminate the litigation, the 
district court by order entered on November 29, 1993, directed 




 This appeal raises one issue of first impression at the 
federal appellate level, and one issue of first impression in the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The former is whether 
the three-year statute of limitations established by Congress for 
contribution claims under CERCLA preempts state nonclaim statutes 
that govern the administration of decedents' estates.  The latter 
issue is whether under CERCLA an estate of a "potentially 
responsible party" can properly establish an indemnity claim 
pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law.  We hold that 
CERCLA does not preempt state nonclaim statutes, and will affirm 
the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the 
defendants.  We also hold that statutory indemnification pursuant 
to Delaware General Corporation Law is not affected by CERCLA, 
and also will affirm the order of the district court granting 




 Dr. H. Albert Beekhuis was an officer, director and 
majority shareholder of Halby Products and Halby Chemical 
Company, both of which were Delaware corporations.  Halby 
operated a chemical manufacturing and distribution business on 
land it owned.   In 1972, Halby was merged into a Witco 
subsidiary, Argus Chemical Company ("Argus"), which subsequently 
was merged into Witco.  Witco is a Delaware corporation.  Argus 
continued to use the site in its chemical business until it sold 
the site to Brandywine Chemical in 1977.  From that time until 
 
 
the present, Brandywine Chemical has used the site as a storage 
and repackaging facility for chemicals. 
 In August, 1985, Dr. Beekhuis entered into a trust 
agreement creating two separate inter vivos trusts, with WTC as 
the trustee for each trust.  The first trust, into which Dr. 
Beekhuis placed substantially all of his assets, was to provide 
for income and maintenance for Dr. Beekhuis and his dependents 
during his lifetime.  It was also to provide his estate upon his 
death with funds to pay debts and other expenses associated with 
settling his estate.  The second trust was a residuary trust 
which was funded by property remaining after the first trust had 
been closed subsequent to the administration of his estate.  
Jeanne Beekhuis, the daughter of Dr. Beekhuis, is the primary 
life beneficiary of the residuary trust.  Upon her death, the 
trust assets will be distributed to various charities. 
 Witco has been aware of potential environmental 
problems on the site since at least June of 1985, when the EPA 
requested information from the company in connection with its 
investigation of the site.  In April of 1986, Witco received a 
Special Notice Letter from the EPA inviting it to perform a 
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) Report for the 
site.  The EPA subsequently placed the site on the CERCLA 
National Priorities List because it had detected various 
hazardous chemicals, such as lead, mercury, cyanide and arsenic, 
in the soil at the site.  In October of 1988, because of a 
release or a substantial threat of a release of hazardous 
substances at the site, the EPA commenced the RI/FS.   
 
 
 On October 28, 1988, Witco notified Dr. Beekhuis of his 
potential liability under CERCLA.  Witco also requested certain 
insurance information from Dr. Beekhuis and informed him that the 
EPA had already spent approximately $700,000 investigating the 
site.  On January 21, 1989, Dr. Beekhuis responded through his 
attorney by providing the requested insurance information. 
 On March 21, 1989, Dr. Beekhuis died.  Jeanne Beekhuis, 
Dr. Beekhuis' daughter, was appointed executrix of the estate.  
Eight months later, after paying the debts of the estate and 
after the Delaware statute of limitations for claims against the 
estate had run, the trustee of the first trust placed all of the 
property remaining in the first trust into the Residuary Trust.  
Between the date of Dr. Beekhuis' death and November 21, 1989, 
Witco took no action with respect to any possible CERCLA 
contribution claim against the estate of Dr. Beekhuis. 
 On January 18, 1990, Witco wrote to the lawyer for Dr. 
Beekhuis' estate, apprising him of Witco's potential claim for 
contribution, and seeking the imposition of a constructive trust 
on the estate's assets pending resolution of the environmental 
problem at the site.  The attorney advised Witco that it was 
premature to request the imposition of a constructive trust as no 
claim had yet been asserted by the EPA against Witco. 
 On December 4, 1990, Witco filed in Delaware state 
court a petition for a constructive trust on the assets in Dr. 
Beekhuis' estate.  The court dismissed the action for failure to 
state a claim.  In re:  Estate of H. Albert Beekhuis, No. 11,853, 
1992 WL 5689 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 1992). 
 
 
 On June 28, 1991, the EPA published its Final Record of 
Decision ("ROD") recommending remedial action for the site.  The 
ROD recommended excavation, stabilization, backfill, and capping 
of contaminated surface soil at the site.  In August of 1991, the 
EPA notified Witco, Argus, Brandywine Chemical, and the estate of 
Dr. Beekhuis that each was a potentially responsible party 
("PRP") for the discharge of hazardous waste at the site.  Each 
party named as a PRP was given the opportunity to participate in 
the planned remedial process for the site.  Witco subsequently 
executed a Consent Decree with the EPA for the remediation of the 
contaminated soil.  United States v. Witco Corp., Consent Decree, 
C.A. 92-93 (D. Del. April 9, 1992).  Pursuant to the Consent 
Decree and the ROD, Witco has incurred remedial response costs 
and expenses for the site. 
 After executing a consent decree with the EPA for 
remediation of the site, Witco filed its claim and thereafter its 
amended claim for contribution against Jeanne Beekhuis, as 
executrix of the estate; WTC, as trustee; and Brandywine 
Chemical.  The Executrix filed an answer and an amended answer to 
the amended complaint asserting a counterclaim against Witco for 
indemnification for all expenses, including attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with this action, the civil action in the 
Delaware state court, and any threatened, pending or completed 
EPA actions, suits, or proceedings. 
 The district court granted the motions of the Executrix 
and WTC for summary judgment on the CERCLA contribution claims.  
Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 822 F.Supp. 1084 (D. Del. 1993).  In a 
 
 
subsequent opinion, the district court granted the Executrix's 
motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim against Witco for 
indemnification.  Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, Mem. Op., C.A. No. 92-






 The district court exercised its jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202, and under 42 U.S.C. § 
9613(b).  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), in that this is an appeal from a final 
judgment as to some but not all parties and issues involved in 
the district court proceedings.  On November 24, 1993, the 
district court entered final judgment on these two orders which 




 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that a 
party is entitled to summary judgment where "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).  A 
 
 
party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its 
motion, and identifying those portions of the "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."  
Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.  Where, as here, the non-moving 
party has the burden of proof at trial on the issue for which 
summary judgment is sought, that party must make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue for 
trial.  Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.  Moreover, the mere 
existence of some evidence in support of the non-moving party 
will not be sufficient to support a denial of a motion for 
summary judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury 
to reasonably find for the non-moving party on the issue.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 




 In support of their motions for summary judgment, 
defendants contend that the Delaware nonclaim statute, Title 12, 
§ 2102, applies in this case, and is a complete bar to the claim 
for contribution.  Section 2102(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
 All claims against a decedent's estate which 
arose before the death of the decedent . . . 
whether due or to become due, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort or other legal 
 
 
basis . . . are barred against the estate, 
the personal representative and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent unless presented as 
provided in § 2104 of this title within 8 
months of the decedent's death whether or not 
the notice referred to in § 2101 of this 
title has been given.   
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 2102(a) (1992) (emphasis added).  
 Defendants argue that because Witco failed to present 
its contingent CERCLA contribution claim to the executrix of Dr. 
Beekhuis' estate by November 21, 1989, eight months after Dr. 
Beekhuis' death, the claim is now forever barred under the 
Delaware nonclaim statute. 
 Witco contends, however, that the CERCLA limitations 
period for contribution claims of three years from the date of 
judgment or a judicially approved settlement applies to this 
case.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) provides, in pertinent part: 
 (3) Contribution   
 No action for contribution for any response 
costs or damages may be commenced more than 3 
years after -- 
  (A)  the date of judgment in any 
action under this chapter for 
recovery of such costs or damages, 
or  
  (B)  the date of . . . entry of a 
judicially approved settlement with 
respect to such costs or damages. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (1988). 
 
 Accordingly, Witco argues that it had three years from 
April 29, 1992, the date of the Consent Decree, to file its 
CERCLA contribution claim.  Since Witco filed its claim on May 
25, 1992, it contends that it is within the CERCLA limitations 
period.  Witco further asserts that to the extent the two 
 
 
statutes conflict, the CERCLA statute of limitations preempts the 
Delaware nonclaim statute.  
 The United States Supreme Court in California Federal 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S. Ct. 683 
(1987) has provided a cogent analysis of when a state law may be 
preempted by federal law.  The Court wrote in that case: 
 In determining whether a state statute is 
pre-empted by federal law and therefore 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, our sole task is to ascertain 
the intent of Congress.  Federal law may 
supersede state law in several different 
ways.  First, when acting within 
constitutional limits, Congress is empowered 
to pre-empt state law by so stating in 
express terms.  Second, congressional intent 
to pre-empt state law in a particular area 
may be inferred where the scheme of federal 
regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress 
"left no room" for supplementary state 
regulation . . . . 
  As a third alternative, in those areas 
where Congress has not completely displaced 
state regulation, federal law may nonetheless 
pre-empt state law to the extent it actually 
conflicts with federal law.  Such a conflict 
occurs either because "compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility," or because the state law 
stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress." 
 
Id. at 280-281, 107 S. Ct. at 689 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 This Court has held that in enacting CERCLA Congress 
has not explicitly preempted all state law on environmental 
subject matter, nor has Congress enacted such a comprehensive 
 
 
scheme of regulation as to provide no room for supplementation by 
the states.  Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 125-26 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (citing Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 106 S. Ct. 1103 
(1986)).  Thus, it is clear that neither the first nor the second 
basis for preemption of state law under Guerra are present in 
this case. 
 Turning to the third basis for preemption of state law, 
we must ask two questions in determining whether a state law 
conflicts with federal law: (1) is it possible to comply with 
both laws, and, (2) does the state law stand as an obstacle to 
the intent of Congress?  Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S. Ct. at 
689.   
 Before examining these two questions, it is important 
to note that federal preemption of state law is not favored.  
This is particularly true in areas of law traditionally dominated 
by the individual states.  See English v. General Electric 
Company, 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990) ("`[w]here 
. . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted' 
includes areas that have `been traditionally occupied by the 
States,' congressional intent to supersede state laws must be 
`"clear and manifest."'" (citing Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 
U.S. 519, 525, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977), quoting Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 
(1947)).  In an area that has been traditionally occupied by the 
states, the court must assume that the prerogatives of the states 
was not to be superseded by a federal law unless it is the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.  See Hillsborough County v. 
 
 
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16, 105 
S. Ct. 2371, 2376 (1985);  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947).  Indeed, for 
preemption to occur in a field traditionally occupied by the 
states, there must be a "sharp" conflict between state law and 
federal policy.  See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 507, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1988).  Since probate matters 
traditionally have been nearly the exclusive concern of the 
states, there is a presumption against preemption of state law.  
 
 A. Is it possible to comply with both statutes? 
 
 The district court correctly observed that in this 
case, it was possible for Witco to comply with both the federal 
and state statutes.  The provision in the Delaware nonclaim 
statute, Title 12, § 2102, fixing an eight-month period for 
filing a claim against an estate and the three-year period for 
making a claim for contribution under CERCLA, are not mutually 
exclusive.  One can notify an estate of a contingent claim within 
eight months of a decedent's death, and also file a contribution 
action within three years of the date of a judgment for response 
costs.  The Delaware nonclaim statute expressly provides for a 
mechanism that can be used to preserve contingent contribution 
claims under CERCLA.  If a contingent claim is asserted but is 
rejected by an executor, the claimant may petition the Delaware 
Chancery Court for an extension of the time within which to file 
that claim.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 2102(c) (1987).   
 
 
 Witco knew in 1988 that it faced potential CERCLA 
liability, and Witco believed that Dr. Beekhuis also was a 
potentially responsible party.  When Dr. Beekhuis died on March 
21, 1989, Witco had eight months within which to notify the 
Executrix of Witco's contingent CERCLA contribution claim.  If 
the Executrix rejected the claim or refused to consent to an 
extension of the time to file the claim, Witco could have 
petitioned the Court of Chancery to extend the time for pursuing 
the claim.  Witco could have preserved its right to seek 
contribution at a later date and thus comply with both statutes.  
 We recognize that there will be instances where a PRP 
seeking contribution will find it impossible to comply with both 
a state nonclaim statute and the CERCLA statute of limitations.  
For instance, a PRP may not become aware of his or her own CERCLA 
liability until well after a state nonclaim statute has run.  
Nevertheless, for the reasons that we discuss below, we conclude 
that preemption is not appropriate.  In the context of 
remediating the environment, we believe that the issue of whether 
a nonclaim statute stands as an obstacle to congressional intent 
is the more important inquiry.  Thus, while under certain 
circumstances a nonclaim statute and the CERCLA statute of 
limitations can be at odds, we do not foresee a substantial 
impediment to the aims and objectives of CERCLA by our holding 
today. 
 
 B.Does the Delaware nonclaim statute stand as  





 The purpose and objective of CERCLA is to provide the 
federal government with broad powers to effectively respond to 
existing and future problems associated with the disposal or 
creation of hazardous wastes, and to ensure "that those 
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical 
poisons bear the cost and responsibility for remedying the 
harmful conditions they created."  United States v. Reilly Tar & 
Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
 Three district courts have held that in the probate 
context, state nonclaim statutes stand as an obstacle to 
Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA.  In Freudenberg-NOK General 
Partnership v. Thomopoulos, 1991 WL 325290, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19421 (D.N.H. Dec. 9, 1991), the court without significant 
discussion found CERCLA and the nonclaim statute in conflict.  
Id. 1991 WL 325290 at *2, at *4.  After examining the legislative 
history of CERCLA, the Thomopoulos court noted that Congress 
intended CERCLA to be given a broad and liberal interpretation.  
Thus, the court held that there was "little doubt as to Congress' 
intent to preempt conflicting state statutes in responding to the 
kinds of environmental hazards posed by" the site in question.  
Id. 1991 WL 325290 at *4.  The courts in Soo Line R.R. Co. v. 
B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F.Supp. 1472 (D. Minn. 1992) and Steego 
Corp. v. Ravenal, 830 F.Supp. 42 (D. Mass. 1993) relied primarily 
on the Thomopoulos decision in their holdings that CERCLA 
preempted the respective state nonclaim statutes. 
 
 
 We decline to adopt the holdings of Thomopoulos, Soo 
Line, and Steego, but rather, we will affirm the holding of the 
district court in this matter that Congress could not have 
implicitly intended to preempt the Delaware nonclaim statute.  
First, and most significantly, a state's interest in the prompt 
settlement of its citizens' estates is particularly strong.  
Probate law, like real estate law and domestic relations law, has 
traditionally been within the province of the individual states.  
Long-standing precedent recognizes that federal claims against 
decedents' estates are subject to state probate laws and 
procedures, unless federal law specifically provides otherwise.  
See, e.g., Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U.S. 217, 225, 57 S. 
Ct. 151, 156 (1936); Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 162-63, 55 S. 
Ct. 370, 372 (1935). 
 Nothing in the language of CERCLA suggests that 
Congress intended to preempt state law governing claims against 
decedents' estates.  Section 9613(f) of CERCLA authorizes 
contribution actions against "any . . . person who is liable or 
potentially liable under Section 9607(a) . . . ."  42 U.S.C. § 
9613(f) (1988).  Section 9607(a) in turn, delineates four classes 
of responsible parties upon whom liability is imposed: (1) the 
current owners or operators of a contaminated property, (2) 
owners or operators of the property at the time of hazardous 
waste disposal, (3) persons who arrange for disposal or treatment 
of hazardous substances at the property, and (4) persons who 
accepted hazardous substances for transport to the property.  42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).  CERCLA does not contain any provision 
 
 
that imposes liability directly upon the estates of those four 
classes of responsible parties.  In light of the traditional 
reluctance of Congress to preempt state laws which are of 
significant importance to the states and traditionally within 
their province, we decline to read into the CERCLA statute the 
congressional intent to except CERCLA claims from state probate 
laws and procedures. 
 Second, by analogy, we can infer strong congressional 
intent not to modify state probate law.  Congress expressly 
endorsed traditional rules of property descent by creating an 
exception to the CERCLA liability scheme called the "innocent 
landowner defense" under Section 9607(b)(3).  Under traditional 
probate law, after a decedent's personal representative pays the 
decedent's debts and distributes any remaining property to 
beneficiaries, creditors who fail to file timely claims lose 
their right to collect from the estate, and property distributed 
is not subject to creditors' claims.  Under the "innocent 
landowner defense," a person who inherits contaminated property 
thereby becoming an owner and a potentially responsible party 
under CERCLA, is entitled to assert the innocent landowner 
defense and escapes liability.  Congress created this exception 
to CERCLA liability in order not to disturb state law controlling 
the descent and distribution of property.  It would be illogical 
for us to conclude that Congress impliedly preempted state 
probate law to expand a CERCLA claimant's right to seek 
contribution against property of a deceased potentially 
responsible party, when Congress expressly narrowed CERCLA 
 
 
liability with regard to the contaminated facility itself (in 
order not to disturb the normal descent and distribution of real 
property under state probate law).   
 Third, we agree with the analysis of the district court 
that Congress did not intend to modify state law governing 
capacity of a party to be sued.  Witco Corp., 822 F.Supp. at 
1089-90.  Section 9613(f) provides: 
   (1) Contribution 
   Any person may seek 
contribution from any other person 
who is liable or potentially liable 
under section 9607(a) of this 
title, during or following any 
civil action under section 9606 of 
this title or under section 9607(a) 
of this title.  Such claims shall 
be brought in accordance with this 
section and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and shall be 
governed by Federal law. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988) (emphasis added). 
 Congress clearly mandated that courts follow the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when adjudicating CERCLA claims.  
Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: "The capacity of an individual, other than one 
acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be 
determined by the law of the individual's domicile."  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 17(b).  As a result, state capacity statutes, as opposed 
to liability statutes, are not preempted under CERCLA.  See Levin 
Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 
(9th Cir. 1987) (state statutes involving capacity to be sued, 
such as statute governing the capacity of dissolved corporations 
 
 
to be sued, are not preempted by CERCLA); United States v. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 746 
(8th Cir. 1986) (in a CERCLA action, "[t]he capacity of a 
corporation to sue or be sued is determined by the law under 
which it is organized"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S. Ct. 
146 (1987); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F.Supp. 
1491 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (city could not pursue CERCLA claim against 
distributees of assets of corporation dissolved in accordance 
with state law).  Thus, following Rule 17(b), we must look to 
Delaware law to determine whether Witco, at this late date after 
the statute of limitations under state law has run, can assert 
its claim against the Executrix. 
 Title 12, § 2102 of the Delaware Code is not merely a 
general statute of limitations, but instead is characterized as a 
"nonclaim" statute.  The purpose of the nonclaim statute is not 
the same as a general statute of limitations which merely seeks 
to avoid stale claims.  Rather, "prompt distribution of the 
assets of the estate is the ultimate goal of the statute."  
Estate of Holton, No. 4682, 1976 WL 5206, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
17, 1976).  The Delaware nonclaim statute terminates an estate's 
capacity to be sued eight months after the death of a decedent 
unless the claim or potential claim is submitted prior thereto.  
The Delaware nonclaim statute makes it impossible under state law 
for a tardy claimant to obtain jurisdiction over a closed estate.  
Accordingly, the executrix of the estate of Dr. Beekhuis is not 




 Last, we conclude that for pragmatic reasons, Congress 
could not have intended for CERCLA to preempt state nonclaim 
statutes.  Preemption would be inherently unworkable.  The 
district court aptly described the problem: 
 Consider the following example, which 
illustrates the pitfalls of adhering to the 
logic of Soo Line and Thomopoulos:  A 
decedent dies today and his estate is settled 
within eight months;  twenty years from now 
the decedent is deemed a potentially 
responsible party under CERCLA, thus 
triggering the three year CERCLA limitations 
period for contribution claims;  a plaintiff 
obtains a judgment against the decedent's 
estate;  in order to collect the judgment, 
the money in the estate must be traced and 
retrieved subject to the applicable defenses.  
The possibility of a CERCLA claim arising 
long after the settlement of the estate would 
hang as a dark cloud over any such 
settlement, thereby compromising the goals of 
certainty and promptness in the settlement 
and distribution of decedent's estates. 
  
Witco Corp., 822 F.Supp. at 1090.   
 We do not believe that Congress intended to unsettle 
estates and create the potential havoc which the district court 
described.  It is merely fortuitous in this case that assets of 
the estate of Dr. Beekhuis are easily traceable and retrievable.  
We must consider the effect of our holding on future estates, 
which may not be as financially intact as that of Dr. Beekhuis.  
It is untenable that Congress intended to reach so deep into the 
domain of state probate administration and use the heavy hand of 
CERCLA to disturb and upset long-settled estates.  The position 
urged by Witco would result in no statute of limitations being 
applicable to CERCLA claims against long-closed and settled 
 
 
decedents' estates -- except three years from the date of 
judgment or entry of a judicially approved settlement under 
CERCLA.  Such a rule would create pandemonium in the descent and 
distribution of decedents' estates.  We decline to imply such an 
intent on the part of Congress merely based upon a three year 




 The Estate requests that Witco indemnify it for all 
expenses, including attorney's fees, it actually and reasonably 
incurred in connection with (i) the defense of Witco's claims in 
this action, (ii) the defense in In re:  Estate of H. Albert 
Beekhuis, No. 11,853, in the Delaware state court, and (iii) the 
response to the investigative and administrative activities of 
the EPA with respect to the site.  The district court correctly 
recognized the strong and clear mandate of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law ("DGCL") in its order requiring Witco to 
indemnify the Executrix for all of the expenses requested. 
 Witco is the surviving corporation in a series of 
mergers that began when Halby was merged into a Witco subsidiary 
in 1972.  The present suit is in effect a suit by a Delaware 
corporation against one of its former officers and directors.  
Witco has assumed all the liabilities of Halby through this 
succession of mergers.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991).  
Thus, for purposes of indemnification, the rights of the Estate 
 
 
must be measured as though Dr. Beekhuis had been an officer and 
director of Witco.1 
 Section 145(c) of DGCL requires a corporation to 
indemnify any director, officer, employee or agent of the 
corporation "[t]o the extent that" he was successful "on the 
merits or otherwise," in defense of any threatened, pending, or 
completed action, suit or proceeding in which he was a party by 
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, 
employee or agent of the corporation.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 
145(c) (1991).2  Section 145(c) is a mandatory provision that 
                     
    1  Section 145(h) of the DGCL provides in pertinent part: 
 
 For purposes of this section, references to "the 
corporation" shall include, in addition to 
the resulting corporation, any constituent 
corporation (including any constituent of a 
constituent) absorbed in a consolidation or 
merger which, if its separate existence had 
continued, would have had power and authority 
to indemnify its directors, officers, and 
employees or agents, so that any person who 
is or was a director, officer, employee or 
agent of such constituent corporation . . . 
shall stand in the same position under this 
section to the resulting or surviving 
corporation as he would have with respect to 
such constituent corporation if its separate 
existence had continued. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(h)(1991). 
    2  Section 145(c) provides: 
  
 To the extent that a director, officer, employee 
or agent of a corporation has been successful 
on the merits or otherwise in defense of any 
action, suit or proceeding referred to in 
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, or 
in defense of any claim, issue or matter 
therein, he shall be indemnified against 
 
 
applies to all Delaware corporations and grants an absolute right 
of indemnification in such situations.  See Green v. Westcap 
Corp. of Delaware, 492 A.2d 260, 265 (Del. Super. 1985). 
 The indemnification rights provided by Section 145 
"continue as to a person who has ceased to be a director, 
officer, employee, or agent and . . . inure to the benefit of the 
heirs, executors and administrators of such a person."  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 8, § 145(j) (1991). 
 The long-standing policy for the indemnification 
provisions in the DGCL has been described as follows: 
 The invariant policy of Delaware legislation 
on indemnification is to "promote the 
desirable end that corporate officials will 
resist what they consider" unjustified suits 
and claims, "secure in the knowledge that 
their reasonable expenses will be borne by 
the corporation they have served if they are 
vindicated."  Beyond that, its larger purpose 
is "to encourage capable men to serve as 
corporate directors, secure in the knowledge 
that expenses incurred by them in upholding 
their honesty and integrity as directors will 
be borne by the corporation they serve." 
 
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. 
Super. 1974) ("Merritt-Chapman") (quoting Folk, The Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 98 (1972)) (citations omitted).  Courts 
                                                                  
expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually 
or reasonably incurred by him in connection 
therewith. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(c)(1991).  Subsections (a) and (b) 
refer to threatened, pending or completed actions, suits and 
proceedings where a person is a party "by reason of the fact that 
he is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the 




have interpreted these indemnification rights very broadly.  
E.g., Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965 F.2d 369, 375 
(7th Cir. 1992) ("Both the language and the purpose of Delaware's 
indemnification statute support interpreting its scope 
expansively.") 
 Witco argues that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the Estate's indemnity counterclaim because 
there are material facts in dispute concerning the alleged basis 
for Dr. Beekhuis' liability.  Witco contends that Dr. Beekhuis 
incurred CERCLA liability by his own personal conduct, and was 
not insulated from that liability by having set up a corporate 
entity and designating himself an officer and director.  The 
theory of Witco's complaint is that Dr. Beekhuis is liable for 
his personal acts and thus, his particular title or role within 
any corporation is irrelevant to his CERCLA liability. 
 We are satisfied that under federal law, Dr. Beekhuis, 
as a director and officer, may be found personally liable as an 
"operator" within the meaning of CERCLA.  See Sidney S. Arst Co. 
v. Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund, No. 93-1227, 1994 WL 
198003 at *2 (7th Cir., May 20, 1994) (corporate officers and 
directors may be held personally liable as "operators" within the 
meaning of CERCLA and that this direct, personal liability is 
distinct from derivative liability for corporate violations); 
Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 
931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) ("CERCLA prevents individuals 
from hiding behind the corporate shield when, as `operators,' 
they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct 
 
 
prohibited by the Act."); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 
F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting cases in which parent 
corporations and shareholders were held liable as "operators" 
under CERCLA); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical Co., 810 F.2d at 743-44 (Congress intended CERCLA 
liability to attach to corporate officers).  Witco alleges that 
Dr. Beekhuis personally designed many of the chemical 
manufacturing and disposal processes used at the site and 
directed construction and maintenance of a lagoon and drainage 
ditch at the site into which chemical waste was regularly 
disposed.  We acknowledge that these allegations may form the 
basis of Dr. Beekhuis' personal "operator" liability under 
CERCLA.   
 Nonetheless, the Delaware courts and legislature under 
state law have chosen to provide broad statutory indemnification 
protection in situations where a corporate officer or director 
successfully defends against claims of personal liability that 
arise from or have a nexus to his corporate position.  In 
Merritt-Chapman, the claimant sought indemnification from 
Merritt-Chapman for expenses incurred in successfully defending 
against criminal charges of perjury and conspiracy to violate 
federal securities law.  Merritt-Chapman, 321 A.2d at 140.  These 
charges arose as a result of the claimant's position as a 
director and officer of Merritt-Chapman.  However, the criminal 
charges were not derivative; they were based on the plaintiff's 
alleged personal participation in the conspiracy and on his 
subsequent alleged perjured testimony.  The court nevertheless 
 
 
found that the plaintiff was entitled to indemnification pursuant 
to Section 145(c) to the extent that he had been successful in 
defending against the criminal charges in question.  Id. at 141-
44. 
 Similarly, in Green, the plaintiff sought 
indemnification pursuant to Section 145(c) for the expenses that 
he incurred in successfully defending against criminal charges 
that arose as a result of his position as vice president of the 
corporation.  Green, 492 A.2d at 262.  The criminal charges 
focused on the plaintiff's personal actions and involvement in 
obtaining a loan for the corporation which the corporation used 
to finance a buy-out.  Id.  Yet, the court did not find that the 
plaintiff was precluded from indemnification because the charges 
were based on his alleged personal as opposed to derivative 
liability.  See also Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965 
F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1992) (Delaware law did not preclude 
indemnification of former corporate director for legal expenses 
incurred in suit alleging failure to disclose environmental 
liabilities in stock purchase agreement since director may have 
been sued in official capacity as well as individually in 
connection with sale of stock); cf. United States v. Lowe, No. 
93-2634, 1994 WL 424243 at *4, (5th Cir., Aug. 15, 1994) 
("[plaintiff's] CERCLA personal liability does not, without more, 
void the indemnity clause [of the corporation's bylaws] . . . . 
Indeed, if [the] officers or directors were not subject to 
personal liability for acts or omissions arising out of their 
 
 
corporate positions, there would be little reason for the 
indemnity clause."). 
 In the instant case, there can be no doubt that there 
is a close nexus between the lawsuits filed by Witco and Dr. 
Beekhuis' former status as an officer and director of Halby.  A 
remand is not necessary since it is evident that Witco's claims 
against Dr. Beekhuis arise by virtue of Dr. Beekhuis' activities 
as a director and officer of Halby.  Witco made no allegations of 
self-dealing, criminal acts, or actions undertaken by Dr. 
Beekhuis which were not performed directly on behalf of Halby.  
Moreover, Witco has not alleged that Dr. Beekhuis neglected 
corporate formalities such that we should "pierce the corporate 
veil" and disregard the corporate entity.  We are satisfied that 
indemnification is available in this matter as a matter of law 
under Section 145 when the corporate agent has successfully 
defended the action against him.  The order of the district court 
granting summary judgment to the Estate on its claim seeking 
indemnification will be affirmed. 
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order dated May 20, 
1993, granting the motions of the Executrix and WTC for summary 
judgment on the CERCLA contribution claims, and the order dated 
November 24, 1993, granting the motion of the Executrix on the 
counterclaim against Witco for indemnification (both of which 
 
 
were made a final judgment by order entered November 29, 1993) 
will be affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
